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In this paper we study convex games with an inﬁnite countable set of agents and
provide characterizations of this class of games. To do so, and in order to overcome some
shortcomings related to the diﬃculty of dealing with inﬁnite orderings, we need to use
a continuity property. Inﬁnite sequencing situations where the number of jobs is inﬁnite
countable can be related to convex cooperative TU games. It is shown that some allocations
turn out to be extreme points of the core of an inﬁnite sequencing game.
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1. Introduction
Orderings on a ﬁnite set are important in sequencing situations and in a game theoretical framework via the marginal
worth vectors and related solution concepts. In particular, marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the Weber set [25],
play a key role in characterizing convex games introduced by Shapley [23], and sequencing situations can be related with
convex games (Curiel et al. [9]).
In this paper we study what happens when we move from a ﬁnite to a countably inﬁnite set of players in convex
games and sequencing situations and related (convex) games. Orderings on an inﬁnite countable set are key tools for our
study, and to cope with them is not a trivial task. The reader is referred to the beginning of Section 4 for our approach to
orderings on N. The concept of convexity can be extended, in a natural way, to cooperative games with transferable utility
(TU -games) where the set of players is countably inﬁnite. However, we will show that many problems arise when we try
to ﬁnd characterizations for this type of inﬁnite games, since they are not straightforward extensions of the ﬁnite ones. In
particular, to assure that the vector of marginal contributions with respect to any order belongs to the core, we need to
introduce an additional property. This is a continuity property and it guarantees, for instance, that we can reach the worth
of an inﬁnite coalition from monotonic sequences of ﬁnite coalitions.
Sequencing situations in different settings and related games have received much attention. An interesting survey on this
topic can be found in Curiel et al. [8]. A ﬁnite sequencing situation arises when a (ﬁnite) number of jobs has to be processed
on a machine, according to a certain order and one tries to optimize a cost function. If the jobs belong to the same agent
he will agree to reorder optimally. The situation is completely different when each job belongs to a different agent. In this
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et al. [9]. They show that ﬁnite sequencing games are convex games and, consequently, with a non-empty core.
Sequencing situations where the set of jobs to be processed is countably inﬁnite occur in many environments. Here
we refer to traﬃc communication networks. In wireless telecommunication networks the so-called mobile stations (they
can be, for instance, phones, laptops or notebooks) are connected to the closest base station. A base station controls what
they call a cell and when users arrive they are in a queue till they are assigned to channels in a ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-served
procedure. Till now, this was a reasonable good protocol because there was only one type of traﬃc. However, the needs
have changed a lot over the last few years because the traﬃc types have increased. Nowadays, some of the most popular
data traﬃc applications are web browsing, email, and many different types of video transmission. Despite the simplicity
of current channel assignment schemes, mainly based on ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-served policies, their performance is non-optimal
since we have to take into account not only the arrival, but also the type of transmission that each job needs. These kinds of
situations play a key role when the system has to deal with congestion problems, i.e. many agents arrive. When the number
of agents increases some characteristics of the problem may be different and inﬁnite situations give insight for analyzing
what may happen.
In this paper we look at cooperative games arising from practical interactive situations where an inﬁnite countable
number of players consider cooperation, with focus on sequencing situations. To consider the set of players as being the
set of natural numbers can be motivated not only as reﬂecting real life situations. There are also other considerations that
lead to modeling games on an inﬁnite countable set of players, since the countable case reﬂects as well situations with
a few inﬂuential players on the one hand and many small players on the other hand. The reader is referred to Aliprantis
and Border [1] for a nice motivation about why use inﬁnite dimensional spaces, where the authors introduce some inﬁnite
dimensional spaces commonly used in economics. The ﬁrst example provided deals with the spaces of sequences because
“when time is modeled as a sequence of discrete dates, then economic series are sequences of real numbers”. And this is the
case we face when tackling a sequencing situation where the set of agents is countably inﬁnite. The solution concept most
treated for cooperative games with countable inﬁnitely many players is the Shapley value. We refer here to Shapley [22],
Artstein [2], Pallaschke and Rosenmüller [20] and Chapter 7 in Rosenmüller [21]. However, we are interested in checking if
certain allocations related to some orderings belong to the core, a central solution concept in ﬁnite TU -games but where
little is known in the inﬁnite countable case. We refer to Kannai [15] for a survey on the core of games with an inﬁnite set
of players.
In the next section we recall some known results on cooperative games with a ﬁnite number of players, sequencing
situations and related (convex) games. Next we study what happens when we move from a ﬁnite to an inﬁnite countable
number of players in convex games. An interesting challenge is to ﬁnd characterizations for this class of games; we illustrate
this issue in Section 3 where three equivalent formulations of convexity for this kind of games are provided. Since we are
interested in sequencing situations we have to clarify how the orderings on the set of positive integers can be described
and, then, Section 4 is devoted to the study of the marginals in inﬁnite convex games. In Section 5 we analyse inﬁnite
sequencing situations and show that the allocations provided by certain division rules are extreme core elements of the
corresponding cooperative TU -games. Some remarks upon these inﬁnite sequencing games are given in Section 6.
2. Preliminaries
Let N be a non-empty ﬁnite set of agents who agree to coordinate their actions and pool their winnings. A ﬁnite coop-
erative game in characteristic function form is an ordered pair (N, v), where N is the ﬁnite set of players and v : 2N → R is
the characteristic function with v(∅) = 0. This function assigns to each group of players (coalition), S ⊂ N, the value v(S)
which represents what the members in S obtain when they jointly cooperate. In a TU -game it is assumed that the utility
can be linearly transferred among agents.
A classic issue in cooperative game theory is how to distribute the proﬁt generated by the cooperating players. One way
to do so is to use allocations in the core of the game. The core of a TU -game (N, v) is the subset of vectors in RN satisfying
(Eﬃciency)
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N), and
(Coalitional rationality)
∑
i∈S
xi  v(S), for all S ⊂ N.
In what follows, we will denote by σ each permutation (bijection) of the ﬁnite player set N , σ : N → N, and by Π(N) the
set of all permutations. For each ﬁnite TU -game (N, v) and for each σ ∈ Π(N), the marginal vector mσ (v) ∈ RN – which
we simply denote by mσ when no confusion may arise – represents the payoff vector when the players join according to
the order in σ and they receive their marginal contribution
mσi = v
(
Pσ (i) ∪ {i})− v(Pσ (i)), for all i ∈ N,
where Pσ (i) represents the set of predecessors of i in σ . The Weber set W (v) of a game (N, v) is the convex hull of all its
marginal vectors.
Since the class of cooperative convex games was introduced by Shapley [23], several equivalent characterizations of ﬁnite
convex games have been given. The following theorem shows ﬁve of them which will play a role throughout this paper.
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(i) v(S) + v(T ) v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ), for all S, T ⊂ N;
(ii) v(S1 ∪ U ) − v(S1) v(S2 ∪ U ) − v(S2), for all S1, S2,U ⊂ N such that S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ N \ U ;
(iii) v(S1 ∪ {i}) − v(S1) v(S2 ∪ {i}) − v(S2), for all S1, S2 ⊂ N, i ∈ N such that S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ N \ {i};
(iv) mσ belongs to the core of (N, v), for each σ ∈ Π(N);
(v) W (v) = C(v).
The ﬁrst three results (supermodularity, increasing marginal returns for groups and players) are due to Shapley, and the
last two are known as the Shapley–Weber–Ichiishi result. The proof of this theorem can be found, for instance, in Branzei
et al. [7]. We will focus on the above statements, although other characterizations are known such as those in Curiel
and Tijs [10], with additive games corresponding to marginal vectors, or the characterization of a convex game using the
exactness of its subgames which can be found in the work of Biswas et al. [5] and Azrieli and Lehrer [4]. The superadditivity
of all marginal games of a game assures the convexity of (N, v). This result has been independently obtained by Branzei
et al. [6] and Martinez-Legaz [17,18].
Convex games arise from many economic settings. Bankruptcy and sequencing situations are two of the best known
among these ones. In a bankruptcy situation one has to divide a given amount of money (the estate) among a set of
agents, each of whom has a claim on it. The total amount claimed exceeds the estate, thus not all claims of the agents
can be completely satisﬁed. Bankruptcy situations were tackled by O’Neill [19] and Aumann and Maschler [3] through ﬁnite
bankruptcy games, which turned out to be convex.
A ﬁnite sequencing situation arises when a (ﬁnite) number of jobs has to be processed in one machine. Each job belongs
to a different agent and there is a queue of jobs in front of the machine. The positions of the agents (jobs) in this queue can
be described by an ordering of the ﬁnite player set N . Therefore, we can represent by a bijection σ : N → N the position of
the agents in a queue, where σ(i) = k means that agent i is at position k. Before the process starts there is an initial order
of agents which we denote here by σ0. The processing time pi of the job of agent i ∈ N is the time the machine needs to
deal with it. The completion time Cσ (i) of the job of agent i with respect to the processing order σ , when we do not allow
unnecessary delays, is determined by
Cσ (i) =
∑
j∈N: σ ( j)σ (i)
p j,
i.e. the waiting time for completing all the jobs that precede i in the queue plus its processing time. Assuming linear cost
functions for each agent i ∈ N , the total cost for all agents is equal to ∑i∈N αiCσ (i), where αi is the cost per unit of time
of job i and the jobs are processed according to σ .
A problem related to a sequencing situation is to determine the optimal order of the jobs, σ ∗ , in such a way that the
total cost saving generated when the jobs are processed according to σ ∗ is maximized, i.e.
∑
i∈N
αi
(
Cσ0(i) − Cσ ∗(i))= max
σ
{∑
i∈N
αiC
σ0(i) −
∑
i∈N
αiC
σ (i)
}
.
If all jobs belong to the same agent, he will agree to reorder them and Smith [24] proved that the optimal order can be
obtained rearranging the jobs according to the urgency indices in decreasing order, where the urgency index of job i is
deﬁned as ui = αi/pi . It should be emphasized that a switch among two jobs is always possible if they are consecutive
in the initial order. When switching two neighbour jobs i, j the change in cost is given by α j pi − αi p j . This difference is
positive if, and only if, the urgency indices verify ui < u j , and if it is negative the switch does not take place. We denote
the gain of this neighbour switch by
gij = (α j pi − αi p j)+ = max{0,α j pi − αi p j}.
Since the optimal order can be obtained by switching consecutive neighbours i, j with ui < u j starting from the initial
order, the total cost savings can be written in terms of the corresponding neighbour gains gij .
When each job belongs to a different agent, a reordering requires that at least the agents involved agree on the new
order. The idea of switching two neighbour jobs can be extended to the case where all agents that own one of the jobs in
between of the two that are switched agree upon the switch. If all agents agree, then the optimal order can be obtained
and it will generate the maximal cost savings with respect to the initial one.
The following question arises: is it possible to share these cost savings among the agents in such a way that the new
order results to be stable? In other words, we want to ﬁnd a fair amount to be given to the different agents, such that all
of them agree on the optimal order and have no incentive to recede from the agreement. In cooperative game theory this
can be achieved using an element of the core of the corresponding cooperative TU -game. Curiel et al. [9] introduced ﬁnite
sequencing games and showed that they are convex and, therefore, they have a non-empty core. For a sequencing situation
with linear cost functions, the corresponding characteristic function of the ﬁnite sequencing game (N, v) can be written
V. Fragnelli et al. / J. Math. Anal. Appl. 362 (2010) 200–209 203in terms of the neighbour gains needed to achieve the maximal cost savings that coalitions can produce by changing jobs
consecutively, using the concept of connected coalitions. A set of agents T is connected according to the initial order σ0 if
σ0(i) < σ0(k) < σ0( j) ⇒ k ∈ T ,
for all i, j ∈ T and k ∈ N . Thus, in a connected coalition T according to σ0 all rearrangements among its members are
allowed because there is nobody in between who is a non-member of T . Therefore, its worth can be reached by neighbour
switches if they were convenient, i.e.
v(T ) =
∑
j∈T
∑
i∈Pσo ( j)∩T
gi j,
where Pσ0 ( j) represents the set of predecessors of j in the initial order.
If coalition S is not connected in σ0, one can calculate its maximal cost savings through its connected components
v(S) =
∑
T∈S\σ0
v(T ),
where S \ σ0 is the set of connected components of S induced by the initial order σ0, taking into account that members
of S cannot jump over agents in N \ S .
Curiel et al. [9] showed that it is possible to determine a core allocation without computing the characteristic function
of the corresponding ﬁnite sequencing game. They propose to share equally between the players i, j the gain gij produced
by each neighbour switch. This is the so-called Equal Gain Splitting (EGS) rule and it assigns to each sequencing situation
a vector in RN which can be computed by
EGSi = 12
∑
k∈Pσo (i)
gki + 12
∑
j:i∈Pσo ( j)
gij
for all i ∈ N . Throughout the paper we use the same notation for rules on a class of sequencing situations and allocations
generated by these rules for a generic situation in this class when no confusion arises.
There exist two other simple division rules, denoted respectively by P and S . According to the ﬁrst one, the gain of each
switch is assigned to the predecessor in the initial order, while the second rule assigns the gain to the successor. We can
write
Pi =
∑
j: i∈Pσo ( j)
gij ∀i ∈ N,
Si =
∑
j∈Pσo (i)
g ji ∀i ∈ N,
and it is easy to see that EGSi = 12 (P + S)i , for all i ∈ N .
Hamers et al. [13] have considered gain splitting rules where the gain generated by each neighbour switch is divided
among the switching players according to a quota and this fraction may be different in each neighbour switch. Such kind
of rules generate the split core of the related cooperative TU -game. If the splitting fraction is the same for all neighbour
switches we refer to them as the GSε rules. When the gain of all neighbour switches is shared assigning to the predecessors
the fraction ε ∈ [0,1] and to the successors the fraction 1− ε, the allocation corresponding to the GSε rule can be deﬁned
as
GSεi = εPi + (1− ε)Si ∀i ∈ N,
where S is obtained when ε = 0, for ε = 12 the EGS is reached, and with ε = 1 we have P .
3. Convex games with a countable number of players
We are interested in extending the concept of a ﬁnite convex game to situations with a countable inﬁnite player set, so
that the characteristic function is deﬁned on the subsets of a countable set. Without loss of generality we will consider the
set of positive integers as the player set, N =N, hereafter. For technical reasons it will be convenient to restrict ourselves to
nonnegative games with bounded value and, to avoid uninteresting complications, it is assumed throughout this paper that
the game is not identically zero. It is known from the literature that many problems arise when we move from a ﬁnite to a
countable inﬁnite set of players. For instance, in the survey by Kannai [15] a suﬃcient condition – involving, among others,
assumptions about the closedness and compactness of several sets – for the non-emptiness of the core of a game deﬁned
on N is established in Theorem 6.1. As Azrieli and Lehrer [4] pointed out the deﬁnition of convexity can be used without
change for games with an inﬁnite countable set of players, so we will consider the following deﬁnition of convex games
(increasing marginal returns for players).
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v
(
S1 ∪ {i}
)− v(S1) v(S2 ∪ {i})− v(S2),
for all S1, S2 ⊂N, i ∈ N such that S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂N \ {i}.
Now we focus on characterizations for this class of games in the spirit of Theorem 1 (i) to (iii). However, in this inﬁnite
context the increasing marginal returns for players and supermodularity are not equivalent as the next example shows.
Example 3. Consider the inﬁnite game (N, v) where
v(S) =
{
1, if |S| = +∞,
0, if |S| < +∞.
It satisﬁes v(S1 ∪{i})− v(S1) v(S2 ∪{i})− v(S2), for all S1, S2 ⊂N, i ∈N such that S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂N\ {i}. However, in this case
if we take S = {1,3,5,7, . . .} and T = {2,4,6, . . .}, then v(S) = v(T ) = 1, v(S∪ T ) = 1, v(S∩ T ) = 0 and the supermodularity
condition
(i) v(S) + v(T ) v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ), for all S, T ⊂ N,
does not hold.
Two types of continuity of the inﬁnite game (N, v), which are called inner and outer continuity, will play a key role in
this process. The ﬁrst one represents the following idea: when we add players, for instance one by one, to a sequence of
increasing coalitions, then the corresponding coalition values should not have any kind of “discontinuity”.
Deﬁnition 4. A game (N, v) is inner continuous at a coalition S ⊂N, if
lim
k→∞
v(Sk) = v(S),
where S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ · · · and ⋃∞k=1 Sk = S . An inﬁnite game is inner continuous if it is inner continuous at every coalition S .
As the next example shows this is not a redundant condition if one seeks to reach the value of a coalition in this inﬁnite
context.
Example 5. Consider the inﬁnite unanimity game (N,uN) and its restrictions to the ﬁrst n players. In this case, uN(N) = 1
and it cannot be reached from the limit of the values of the corresponding ﬁnite games, which are always 0.
Proposition 6. If the game (N, v) is convex and inner continuous, then it is supermodular.
Proof. Given S, T ⊂ N, let S \ T = {s1, s2, s3, . . .} with s1 < s2 < s3, . . . . Note that this is possible because each subset of
natural numbers has always a smallest element, and S \ T can be ﬁnite or inﬁnite. Then, taken into account the inner
continuity, we have for r  1 and sr ∈ S \ T
v(S) − v(S ∩ T ) =
∑
r1
(
v
(
(S ∩ T ) ∪ {s1, . . . , sr}
)− v((S ∩ T ) ∪ {s1, . . . , sr−1})) (1)
and
v(S ∪ T ) − v(T ) =
∑
r1
(
v
(
(T ) ∪ {s1, . . . , sr}
)− v((T ) ∪ {s1, . . . , sr−1})) (2)
where for convenience {s1, . . . , sr−1} = ∅ for r = 1. Since each term in the sum of (1) is by hypothesis not larger than the
corresponding term in (2),
v(S) + v(T ) v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ), for all S, T ⊂ N,
holds. 
In a similar way, it can be shown that another kind of continuity has to be considered when we try to achieve the value
of a coalition from a monotonic non-increasing sequence of coalitions. This means that if we consider the groups of agents
obtained when the players are removed one by one, for example, from a larger coalition, then the limit of the associated
values can be different from the value of the smallest coalition. To avoid this problem we will only consider games which
are outer continuous.
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lim
k→∞
v(Sk) = v(S),
where S1 ⊃ S2 ⊃ · · · and ⋂∞k=1 Sk = S . An inﬁnite game is outer continuous if it is outer continuous at every coalition S .
Deﬁnition 8. An inﬁnite game is continuous if it is inner and outer continuous.
In order to analyse the convexity of an inﬁnite game, in the next theorem we give equivalent formulations which lead to
convex games when the inﬁnite game is continuous. The proof is left to the reader because the main steps resemble those
in the ﬁnite case (cf. Branzei et al. [7]).
Theorem 9. Given an inﬁnite continuous game (N, v), the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) v(S) + v(T ) v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ), for all S, T ⊂ N;
(ii) v(S1 ∪ U ) − v(S1) v(S2 ∪ U ) − v(S2), for all S1, S2,U ⊂ N such that S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ N \ U ;
(iii) (N, v) is convex.
4. On the marginals in inﬁnite convex games
In this inﬁnite setting, before introducing a suitable Weber set we have to clarify how we can describe the position of
the agents in a queue. An ordering in N can be seen as an ordered partition {σ k}k∈K of N, whose elements are either ﬁnite
sets or countable sets possessing a least element ik with k ∈ K = {1,2, . . .}. One can express every element of each σ k either
in terms of predecessors of ik or in terms of successors of ik . We denote by Ξ(N) the set of all orderings on N. For instance,
the natural ordering σ ′ = (1,2,3, . . .) and the reverse one σ ′′ = (. . . ,3,2,1) consist of only one class: that of the orderings
with the smallest element 1 = i1. The elements in σ ′ can be written by listing the successors of 1, while for σ ′′ we have to
use its predecessors. On the other hand, if we consider σ = (1,3,5, . . . , . . . ,6,4,2), i.e. ﬁrst the odd numbers in the natural
order and, then, the even numbers in the reverse order, we can reconstruct the sequence using 1 = i1 and its successors
inside the class σ 1 = (1,3,5, . . .), and 2 = i2 together with its predecessors within its own class σ 2 = (. . . ,6,4,2). So, we
can write σ as {σ 1} ∪ {σ 2}, i.e. K = {1,2}, and this is the key to obtain the marginal vector corresponding to any order σ .
In the ﬁnite case Shapley [23] stated that if a game is supermodular, then the core is non-empty. Ichiishi [14] showed
that if for each σ ∈ Π(N) the marginal vector mσ is a core element, then the game is convex. Weber [25] proved, by
induction on the number of players, that the core is always included in the convex hull of the so-called Weber allocations,
i.e. the marginal vectors. In his proof Derks [11] uses a separation theorem. Thus, for ﬁnite games, the core is equal to the
Weber set if and only if the game is convex. Nevertheless, in general, in inﬁnite dimensions the convex hull of a compact
set is not necessarily compact, even closed. This is the key point to introduce the Weber set of an inﬁnite game (N, v) as
the closure (in the weak topology) of the convex hull of all marginal vectors,
W (v) := cl(conv{mσ ∣∣ σ ∈ Ξ(N)}).
The outcomes we are looking for, x ∈ RN , are in the space of sequences 1 = {x ∈ RN: ‖x‖1 < +∞}, where ‖x‖1 =∑
i∈N |xi |, and converge absolutely because we have restricted ourselves to nonnegative games with bounded value. Thus,
we can consider the core of a game (N, v) as the subset of vectors in 1 satisfying eﬃciency and coalitional rationality, i.e.
C(v) =
{
x ∈RN: ‖x‖1 = v(N) and
∑
i∈S
xi  v(S), for all S ⊂N
}
.
In the following, we study relations between the marginals of an inﬁnite convex game and the core C(v). Note that for
arbitrary convex games with countable number of players, it is not obvious that a marginal vector has to be in the core
of the game. Example 5 illustrates this fact, since 0∞ ∈ conv{mσ |σ ∈ Ξ(N)} because the marginal payoff vector associated
with the natural order is zero and, of course, it is in the closure of the convex hull of all marginal vectors, but 0∞ /∈ C(v)
because it consists of all inﬁnite sequences whose components are nonnegative and its sum is equal to one. However, if the
inﬁnite convex game is continuous, then the vectors of marginal contributions belong to the core of game.
Theorem 10. If the inﬁnite game (N, v) is convex and continuous, then mσ belongs to the core of (N, v) for all σ ∈ Ξ(N).
Proof. For the sake of brevity, in the sequel we denote by mσ the marginal vector for all σ =⋃k∈K σ k in Ξ(N). First, we
have
∑
mσi =
∑(∑
k
mσi
)
=
∑(∑
k
(
v
(
Pσ (i) ∪ {i})− v(Pσ (i)))
)
= v(N),i∈N k∈K i∈σ k∈K i∈σ
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ative terms and the game is continuous.
On the other hand,∑
i∈S
mσi =
∑
i∈S
(
v
(
Pσ (i) ∪ {i})− v(Pσ (i)))∑
i∈S
(
v
(
Pσ|S (i) ∪ {i})− v(Pσ|S (i)))
=
∑
i∈S
m
σ|S
i =
∑
k∈K∩S
(∑
i∈σ k
(
v
(
Pσ|S (i) ∪ {i})− v(Pσ|S (i)))
)
= v(S)
where Pσ|S (i) = Pσ (i) ∩ S . The inequality holds because the game is nonnegative and convex, and the last equality fol-
lows from the fact that there is a countable nonnegative telescopic sum and the game is continuous. Thus, the marginal
vector mσ , for all orders σ , is in the core of the inﬁnite game (N, v). 
The marginal vectors are not only in the core, but they are also extreme points of the core as the next result shows.
Theorem 11. Let (N, v) be a convex and continuous inﬁnite game. For all σ ∈ Ξ(N), mσ is an extreme point of the core of (N, v).
Proof. (i) We claim that
∑
i∈S mσi = v(S), for S of the form Pσ (σ ( j)) and also of the form Pσ (σ ( j)) ∪ {σ( j)} with j ∈ N.
Using continuity the ﬁrst claim follows, similarly as in the proof of the eﬃciency of mσ of Theorem 10, by decomposing∑
i∈Pσ (σ ( j))mσi in generalized telescopic sums. The second claim follows by noting that∑
i∈Pσ (σ ( j))∪{σ ( j)}
mσi = v
(
Pσ
(
σ( j)
))+mσσ ( j) = v(Pσ (σ( j))∪ {σ( j)}).
To prove that mσ is an extreme point of the core C(v) we need to show that for pairs x, y ∈ C(v) with mσ = 12 (x + y)
we have x = y =mσ . Consider a pair x, y ∈ C(v) with mσ = 12 (x+ y). Note that for such pairs we have∑
i∈S
xi =
∑
i∈S
yi = v(S), (3)
for each S ∈ 2N with ∑i∈S mσi = v(S). Taking into account (i) and (3) we ﬁnd, for pairs x, y and j ∈N,
xσ ( j) =
∑
i∈Pσ (σ ( j))∪{σ ( j)}
xi −
∑
i∈Pσ (σ ( j))
xi = v
(
Pσ
(
σ( j)
)∪ {σ( j)})− v(Pσ (σ( j)))=mσσ ( j),
and it also holds that yσ( j) =mσσ( j) . Thus, we can conclude that x = y =mσ . 
These results assure that for a continuous inﬁnite convex game the closure of the convex hull of all marginal vectors,
W (v), is contained in the core C(v) of the game, since the core is a closed convex set. However, this does not imply that
W (v) ⊂ C(v) for any inﬁnite convex game, as we can derive from Example 5.
5. Sequencing situations with countable number of players
To fulﬁll our aim for dealing with congestion problems in wireless telecommunications systems, we need to extend
sequencing situations to the case in which there is a countably inﬁnite number of agents, each of whom has one job to be
processed. The difference between these situations and the semi-inﬁnite ones, introduced in Fragnelli [12], is that in the
latter paper the number of jobs is inﬁnite but the number of agents is ﬁnite. In our inﬁnite sequencing situations the set of
agents can be represented by N and we suppose that they are numbered as they are in the queue in front of the counter
(machine). Thus, we assume that the initial order, σ0 ∈ Ξ(N), coincides with the natural order of N and, consequently,
consists of only one class: that of smallest element 1, which can be described using 1 and its successors.
As in the ﬁnite case, in inﬁnite sequencing situations if the urgencies associated with two consecutive jobs are such that
ui < ui+1, it is possible to reduce the overall cost via a neighbour switch. The inﬁnite sequencing game associated with an
inﬁnite sequencing situation (N, v) has N as its player set and the corresponding characteristic function can be described by
the neighbour switch gains which are needed to obtain the maximal cost savings that coalitions can produce by changing
jobs consecutively. We consider only inﬁnite sequencing situations where the total gain that can be obtained reordering
optimally the jobs is bounded. Since we assume that the initial order coincides with the natural order of N, a coalition T
is connected according to the initial order if i < k < j implies k ∈ T , for all i, j ∈ T and k ∈ N. Therefore, the total gain of
a connected coalition T can be obtained through neighbour switches
v(T ) =
∑ ∑
σo
gi j,
j∈T i∈P ( j)∩T
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the set of maximal connected subsets of S , i.e. its partition in connected components.
Deﬁnition 12. Given an inﬁnite sequencing situation, the corresponding inﬁnite sequencing game (N, v) is a cooperative
TU -game with
v(S) =
∑
T∈S/σ0
v(T ) ∀S ⊂ N,
where S/σ0 is the partition in connected coalitions induced by the order σ0 ∈ Ξ(N).
Remark 13. We are interested in inﬁnite sequencing games such that if we consider the ﬁnite sequencing situations in
which only the ﬁrst n jobs are kept and the corresponding sequence of ﬁnite games ([1,n], vn), where [1,n] denotes the
set {1,2, . . . ,n}, we can obtain the characteristic function of this inﬁnite sequencing game (N, v) as
lim
n→+∞ vn
(
S ∩ [1,n])= v(S),
for all S ⊂N. This means that, in the sequel, we will focus on inﬁnite sequencing games which are continuous.
Since ﬁnite sequencing games turn out to be convex games, a natural question is to look for a similar property for
inﬁnite sequencing games.
Proposition 14. Let (N, v) be a continuous sequencing game corresponding to an inﬁnite sequencing situation. Then (N, v) is a convex
game.
Proof. Since ([1,n], vn) is convex because it corresponds to a ﬁnite sequencing situation, we have vn(S ∩ [1,n]) +
vn(T ∩ [1,n])  vn((S ∪ T ) ∩ [1,n]) + vn(S ∩ T ∩ [1,n]), for all S, T ⊂ N. Taking the limit for n → +∞, by continuity we
obtain (i) of Theorem 9. So (N, v) is a convex game. 
Consider the division rules P and S in our setting; it is easy to prove that the allocations provided by them belong to
the core of the corresponding sequencing game. In fact, eﬃciency clearly holds and, for a connected coalition T , we have:∑
i∈T
Pi =
∑
i∈T
∑
j: i∈Pσ0 ( j)
gij 
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈T : i∈Pσ0 ( j)
gij = v(T )
and ∑
i∈T
Si =
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pσ0 (i)
g ji 
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈Pσ0 (i)∩T
g ji = v(T ).
Consequently, by the convexity of the core, we have that also GSε belongs to the core for all ε ∈ [0,1].
Taking into account that the initial order σ0 coincides with the natural order of N, P and S can be written as:
P =
(∑
j2
g1 j,
∑
j3
g2 j, . . .
)
and S =
(
0, g12,
∑
j2
g j3,
∑
j3
g j4, . . .
)
.
The following result shows that these allocations are not only in the core, but they are also extreme points of the core
when the game is continuous.
Proposition 15. P and S are extreme points of the core of the corresponding continuous inﬁnite sequencing game.
Proof. Let (N, v) be a continuous inﬁnite sequencing game. To prove that P =(∑ j2 g1 j,∑ j3 g2 j, . . .) is an extreme
point of C(v), let x, y be two core allocations such that P = 12 (x + y). We will show that x = y = P through an induction
procedure.
By eﬃciency, we know that
∑
i1 xi =
∑
i1 Pi , and using coalitional rationality we have∑
i2
xi  v
(
N \ {1})=∑
i2
∑
j>i
gi j =
∑
i2
Pi .
Thus, consequently, x1  P1. Since the inequality y1  P1 can be derived similarly and P1 = 12 (x1 + y1), we obtain x1 =
y1 = P1. Now, we suppose that x j = y j = P j , for all j = 1, . . . ,k − 1, and we are going to prove that xk = yk = Pk .
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∑
ik xi =
∑
ik Pi . By coalitional rationality we
can obtain∑
ik+1
xi  v
(
N \ {1, . . . ,k})= ∑
ik+1
∑
j>i
gi j =
∑
ik+1
Pi,
and then xk Pk . Similarly, we obtain yk Pk and taking into account that Pk = 12 (xk + yk), it holds xk = yk = Pk .
To prove that S =(0, g12,∑ j2 g j3,∑ j3 g j4, . . .) is an extreme point of C(v), let x, y be two core allocations with
S = 12 (x+ y). We will show that x = y = S .
By coalitional rationality, we have x1  v(1) = 0 = S1 and y1  S1 can be derived in the same way. Since S1 = 12 (x1+ y1),
then x1 = y1 = S1. Assume that x j = y j = S j , for all j = 1, . . . ,k − 1. We will prove that xk = yk = Sk .
Using coalitional rationality we have
k∑
i=1
xi  v
({1, . . . ,k})=
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=i+1
gij =
k∑
i=1
Si
and, applying the hypothesis, xk  Sk . The related inequality, yk  Sk , is obtained using a similar procedure. As Sk =
1
2 (xk + yk) we can conclude that xk = yk = Sk . 
6. Concluding remarks
Since we know from Remark 13 that v(S) = limn→∞ vn(S ∩ [1,n]), we may approximate P,S and GSε with the corre-
sponding solutions in a suitable ﬁnite game ([1,n], vn). More precisely, for each δ > 0 we can ﬁnd nδ ∈N such that∑
j∈N
∑
i< j
gi j −
∑
j∈[1,nδ]
∑
i< j
gi j < δ,
and the allocations
P(vnδ ) =
( ∑
j∈[2,nδ]
g1 j,
∑
j∈[3,nδ ]
g2 j, . . . , gnδ−1,nδ ,0,0, . . .
)
,
S(vnδ ) =
(
0, g12,
∑
j2
g j3, . . . ,
∑
jnδ−1
g j,nδ ,0,0, . . .
)
satisfy Pi − Pi(vnδ ) < δ and Si − Si(vnδ ) < δ, for all i ∈ N. As a consequence, GSε can be approximated in the same way.
If we allow an unbounded total gain
∑
j∈N
∑
i∈Pσ0 ( j) gij = +∞, we can ﬁnd core elements in an easy way like the
so-called utopia payoff vectors in Llorca et al. [16] for inﬁnite assignment games. In this case, our proposal would be
ui = Pi + Si for each agent i ∈ N, i.e. to add the gains of the successors and the predecessors.
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